Islamic ethics, sufism in the teachings of Ḥasan Ḥasanʹzādah Āmulī; a renowned Iranian scholar.

A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know nothing.’ Call this the skeptical use of the word ‘know.’ In apparent contradiction of the skeptic's claims, almost all of us firmly ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. We use the word ‘know’ and its cognates frequently and fluently in largely untroubled communication with our fellows. We make judgments ascribing knowledge to ourselves and others. Furthermore, faced with the same situation and needing to make a judgment about (...) whether to ascribe knowledge or not, we agree on the whole with each other's ascriptions. For the sake of a term, and being careful to neglect any stray connotations it may carry, let us call this the cognitivist use of ‘know.’. (shrink)

This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in (...) q”. It is then argued that no beliefs – not even beliefs about phenomenal experiences – are foundational in the required way. Both coherentism and infinitism are untenable, since, since they face various objections, most significantly the objection that acceptance of either would commit one to allowing that all beliefs were justified. Because the three possible accounts of justificational structure all fail radically, it is concluded that no beliefs are justified. (shrink)

Sceptics have been accused of achieving their sceptical conclusions by an arbitrary (though usually implicit) redefinition of terms like “justified”, so that, while it may be true that no belief is justified in the sceptic’s new sense of the word, all the beliefs we have taken as justified remain so in the ordinary, standard meaning of the term. This paper defends scepticism against this charge. It is pointed out that there are several sorts of case where someone’s belief may be (...) properly termed justified in one “sense”, or from one “point of view”, but from another, equally properly termed unjustified. It is argued that the point of view of the sceptic, or the sense in which he uses the term, is one of the perfectly standard ones, and not some arbitrarily introduced new sense. In addition, an explanation that is not damaging to scepticism is provided of a sceptic’s own continued ascriptions of justifiedness in everyday contexts. (shrink)

In his justifiedly famous paper, “Elusive Knowledge” (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:4, 1996), David Lewis presents a contextualist account of knowledge, which, like other contextualist accounts, depicts sceptical claims as involving application of a higher standard of knowledge than is applied in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. On Lewis’ account, the sceptic’s denials and the everyday ascriptions are made in different contexts, which allows them both to be true. His account gives detailed specification of how contexts are to be determined. My (...) paper points out that this view is unattractive to the sceptic, since it makes scepticism, even if true, completely disconnected from and irrelevant to the rest of our cognitive discourse. After arguing that the sceptic’s own ascriptions of knowledge (made outside the philosophy seminar room) can be explained in non-contextualist ways, I expound and criticise Lewis’ analysis of knowledge, taking up in particular a central component of his account, the “Rule of Attention”. In the central part of the paper I argue that the reasons given for the inclusion of the rule are all inadequate, and also that there are positive reasons for rejecting it. The final section of the paper argues that the excision of the Rule of Attention removed would leave Lewis’ account subject to serious counter- examples. (shrink)

We do not usually draw conclusions and summarize the results of our round table meetings. The speakers share their ideas, divergent viewpoints are discussed, and a certain level of approach to the problems under discussion is formulated. Therefore, today I will also not attempt to draw a conclusion.

A characteristic mark of the times is the steadily growing interest in our past, in our native philosophical legacy, which by dint of tragic circumstances was expunged from Soviet culture.

A large team of well-known Soviet scholars is currently preparing a new textbook in philosophy. We thought it might be useful to acquaint the broad philosophical public with the ideas that guided the authors in writing the textbook, and have included its table of contents, preface, and conclusion. We also, together with the team of authors, are hoping for readers' responses. The book will be published shortly by Politizdat Publishers.

I am not so insular and I hope not so presumptuous as to suppose that there is no contemporary philosophy apart from that empiricism which dominates very much of Great Britain, North America and Scandinavia. So let us notice that contemporary philosophy embraces broadly three points of view, though it will be part of my argument that they largely combine in the lessons they have to teach us, and in many of their implications for theology.

I wrote this essay for three reasons. First, in proofreading The Reconstruction of the Humanistic Spirit, I felt that this great pile of articles contained only general discourses on the social and cultural problems of China and the Western world but did not mention my own philosophical position and religious faith. Although the pattern and style of the essays in this book might excuse this defect, I was afraid that some of my readers would find it difficult to grasp the (...) main themes of thought in the book. Therefore, I wanted to write an article to compensate a bit for this shortcoming. Second, for many years, in teaching courses on Chinese or Western philosophy, I have been used to following the general lecturing method of university professors who stress the objective introduction of philosophical doctrines to enrich students' knowledge. (shrink)

My discussion in previous chapters was limited to the origin of Chinese culture and its fundamental spirit exhibited in the process of historical development. In what follows, I am going to discuss the spirit of Chinese culture in specific areas such as philosophy of nature, theory of human nature, ideals of moral life, the world of daily living, the world of ideal personalities, and the spirit of art and religion. The center of discussion will be a comparison between Chinese and (...) Western philosophy and culture. Therefore, before discussing Chinese cosmologies, I am going to present the cosmologies in the West as a preparation for comparison. Nevertheless, the main task of this chapter is not a special treatise on the natural sciences and philosophies of China and the West. Instead, my focus is on the differences between ideas of nature, their values and fundamental spirit. I hope my readers understand this point first. (shrink)

We may have different ways of defining the nature of philosophy. One view would take philosophy to be a system of knowledge just like science; only it is a more comprehensive system that includes all science, or rather, it is a synthetic system of knowledge. Another view would take philosophy to be just a reflective and critical attitude. It purports to reflect on methods, postulates, axioms, and fundamental concepts that science relies on to build its knowledge in order to clarify (...) other scientific concepts and principles and to understand the limit of each science and of scientific knowledge itself so that they will not be wrongly applied to areas where they do not apply. Still another view would take philosophy to be that which helps us to understand the universe and human life, to have wisdom to penetrate into history, culture, and concrete affairs, and to give us direction for our actions. Of these three, the first view takes philosophy to be an activity for pursuing knowledge, the second view takes philosophy to be an activity for understanding our knowledge, and the third view takes philosophy to be an activity that starts with knowledge in order to achieve wisdom, which is above and beyond knowledge. All these views have their justifications. I would like to elaborate on them in the following. (shrink)

As the title suggests, in this part of the essay I am going to discuss in brief the religious spirit of Confucianism.

In our discussion on the development of political consciousness in the Chinese people in the past one hundred years, we will focus on the upward development made in the course of the reconstruction of the nation. If we simply study the historical facts, the past one hundred years are tragic. But if we study the spirit of the people during this period, we cannot but recognize that the Chinese people have never given up and that they have been constantly struggling (...) upward. In the history of their struggle the Chinese people have gone astray many times; otherwise, the country would not be what she is now. But from mistakes corrections are made, thus eliminating the possibility of repeating the same mistakes. This is what we call the instructional value of history. From this view, the Chinese people are presently undergoing a crisis in which they seem to have nothing to support and nothing to possess. But spiritually and ideologically, the Chinese people possess the most substantial "have," one that no other people or nation of the world has had. This most substantial "have" is the historical experience gained through the continuous upward struggle against failures in the reconstruction of their nation. This historical experience can be valuable only when it has become the self-consciousness of the people and their future generations. This self-consciousness is related mainly to the development of political consciousness in the Chinese people in the past hundred years. (shrink)

In one sense, all academic thoughts are human ideas, and all cultures are productions of man. Therefore, the spirit of all human cultures is always humanistic. To discuss any kind of academic thoughts is to discuss the ideas of man. Speaking in this way, however, we cannot reveal and illuminate the meaning of such terms as "humanistic thought" or "humanistic spirit" because of the lack of contradistinctions. We must then say that, in addition to humanistic thought or spirit, there are (...) also human thoughts or spirit which are nonhumanistic, super-humanistic, subhumanistic, and even antihumanistic. (shrink)